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BOOK REVIEW 
ALTERNATIVES TO REGULATION. By Michael S. Baram. 
Boston, Ma.: Lexington Books, 1982. Pp. 245. 
Reviewed by Sheldon Krimsky* 
A leading target of reform for the Reagan administration is the 
role of the federal government in regulating industry. According to 
the conservative view, the federal role in protecting society from the 
adverse effects of a free market may start with good intentions, but 
eventually the programs became self-serving and place industry in a 
maze of irrational constraints. Remove the yoke of regulatory 
bureaucracy and there will be a more competitive climate for 
business, greater inducement for domestic investment, a rise in pro-
ductivity, and a reduction in the high costs of senseless litigation. All 
in all, the argument continues, the consumer benefits by the elimina-
tion of the inefficiencies of production and a reduction in the size and 
complexity of government. 
But what about the health and environmental consequences of 
technology? How should society protect itself from the short-sighted 
actions of an anarchy of private interests? Despite its title, Alter-
natives to Regulation is not a treatise on the elimination of regula-
tion. It examines a variety of policy instruments that have been used 
in lieu of or as a complement to federal intervention. The alter-
natives are in the form of indirect controls. These include the ap-
plication of common law in cases where negligence or liability can be 
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demonstrated; insurance mechanisms, and the power of government 
to influence the adoption of voluntary industrial standards. 
Two important features stand out in this work. First, it effectively 
dispels the myth that regulation is synonymous with federal rules 
and bureaucracies. Second, it is not a crass ideological defense of less 
government. There are areas where additional federal intervention 
is supported. Baram establishes his goal in the introduction: "This is 
not an attempt to undermine the need for health, safety, or en-
vironmental regulation by government. Indeed the government's 
continuing responsibility to deal with such risks is assumed."l In this 
work, the author hopes to reopen the debate over regulatory policy 
from a nonsectarian standpoint where consideration is given to what 
works. Toward this end, Baram and his staff of legal researchers 
have compiled an inventory of examples where public health and 
safety are promoted without complex and burdensome governmen-
tal rules. 
The book reads like a series of legal briefs with summaries of court 
actions and analyses of federal regulatory law. Half of it is devoted 
to three chapters covering common law alternatives; private, volun-
tary self-regulation; and insurance. Another chapter examines the 
use of the government's procurement power to influence industrial 
standards. Three case studies treat high voltage transmission lines, 
automotive design defects, and the disposal of hazardous wastes. 
The cases provide a summary of the risks of each activity, the 
prevailing laws and regulations, and analyze the rationale and pros-
pects for alternatives to direct federal controls. 
The central argument in the book is embodied in the term 
regulatory flexibility, according to which more options must be 
available to federal regulators and policymakers. The agencies of 
government should operate with a full menu of alternatives to direct 
federal controls which Baram contends "could result in fewer 
economic dislocations, less federal intrusion and better risk manage-
ment."2 
Perhaps because the author takes a narrow legalistic approach to 
the problems of regulation and exhibits little awareness of the 
political economy of the U.S. regulatory system, he is oblivious to a 
fatal flaw in the book's central thesis. The flexible, more cost effi-
cient, alternatives to direct government intervention suggested by 
the work for general applicability are reasonable in a non"politicized 
1 M. BARAM, ALTERNATIVES TO REGULATION 7 (1982). 
2 [d. at 150. 
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regulatory bureaucracy - the type of professional civil service 
characteristic of the British system. Our current regulatory struc-
ture, unlike that of Great Britain, responds like a sensitive 
barometer to political currents irrespective of rationality, public 
health, or the desires of Congress. Progress was made in slowing 
down the rapid decay of air and water quality in the 1970's precisely 
because the laws enacted included specific attainment goals, and a 
framework for implementation. 
Two important effects are likely to occur if we expand the discre-
tion of regulatory agencies to include the use of indirect controls and 
incentives. First, the courts will be dragged in to resolve policy 
disputes even more complex and intractable than those of recent 
years. Regulatory agencies can more easily pass the buck to the in-
surance industry or professional associations when more alter-
natives to rulemaking are available. Second, discretion will eventual-
ly favor the more stable and powerful economic interests, which are 
not necessarily compatible with the public welfare. 
The fallacy of using strict liability as a nonregulatory model for 
managing risk is best illustrated by the current problems in the 
asbestos industry. For over half a century, tens of thousands of 
asbestos workers in the U.S. were exposed to the dust of this natural 
fiber while it was being mined, processed and applied. Years after 
their exposure, some workers contracted severe respiratory diseases 
or lung cancer. Over ten thousand suits have been filed charging that 
companies were negligent in protecting workers from asbestos-
related diseases. Recently, the largest of these companies, the Man-
ville Corporation, filed for bankruptcy to avoid paying costly 
lawsuits. Because of the long latency period between exposure and 
the onset of asbestos-related disease, the litigation and high in-
surance costs came too late to have any influence on establishing bet-
ter working conditions in the industry. Furthermore, events in the 
asbestos industry seem to have little bearing on the safety conditions 
in the chemical industry as a whole. In the best of all circumstances, 
where the etiology of occupational disease can be determined, where 
those harmed have resources to initiate litigation, where the latency 
period between exposure to agents and symptoms of disease is short, 
companies can decide it is in their interest to pay high insurance 
premiums and settle litigation rather than improve the standards of 
an industry. That may be rational from the standpoint of business ef-
ficiency but it treats the health of workers as a neutral entry in the 
balance sheets. The asbestos story makes a very clear argument that 
the industry, the government and the workers would have all 
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benefited over the long run from strict federal regulations on the ex-
posure to asbestos before all the epidemiological data were in. 
Although I find the book's central thesis calling for regulatory flex-
ibility unconvincing when applied to health and safety issues, the 
case studies and inventory of alternatives provide useful lessons to 
policy makers on the successes and failures of direct governmental 
intervention. In this respect the book is a valuable addition to the 
new generation of regulatory literature. 
